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I. INTRODUCTION
Our chairman said that the task of this panel is to discuss preemptive
military intervention to combat either: the threatened use of force, for example,
by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction; or outrageous human
rights violations, like genocide. While these two categories of threat look quite
different, I think it is instructive to discuss them together in the context of
preemption, and I am glad we are doing so.
In my presentation, I plan to do the following three things: outline where
the law relating to humanitarian intervention stands post-Kosovo; outline where
the law relating to preemptive self-defense stands post-September 11 th (9/11);
and offer a few modest proposals on how to improve the quality of the United
Nations Security Council (Security Council) decision-making on these issues.
My central argument is that the law is less restrictive than meets the eye, but
there are substantial weaknesses in the existing legal and institutional regimes.
Those weaknesses can be addressed through a number of substantive and
procedural steps, which would constitute a politically viable evolution, but not
a revolution in the existing legal order. My proposals focus on the Security
Council, not because I believe it has any inherent claim to legitimacy, but
because I do not think I can properly defend a more radical transformation of
the international legal order in only ten minutes. However, I will conclude with
one somewhat radical suggestion, which we may be able to take up in the
discussion period.
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II. Kosovo: HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY AS AN EXCUSE
I do not intend to review the law relating to humanitarian intervention at
length, but rather focus on the international reaction to the Northern Alliance
Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In my view,
that is the most illuminating way of understanding where the law currently
stands.
The weight of scholarly and official opinion is that the intervention was
illegal.' None of the three principal legal justifications: authority based on
existing Security Council resolutions; a customary right of humanitarian inter-
vention; or self-defense, was persuasive. However, my reading of the inter-
national reaction to the intervention is that NATO's violation of the law was in
effect excused.
The best way of characterizing what happened from a legal point of view
is that an interpretive community of governments and actors represented on the
Security Council, along with other interested governments, such as lawyers,
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and blue ribbon panelists, deemed
the intervention illegal, but turned a blind eye to the violation of the law given
the extreme circumstances.
Without going into details, I would argue that this reading is supported by
the many statements of government representatives who were disinclined to
accept the legality of the intervention, but reluctant to condemn it. This
includes many Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Islamic countries, and even
some NATO countries who stressed the exceptional nature of the action and
down-played its relevance as a precedent.
Therefore, the law on humanitarian intervention post-Kosovo is as follows:
it is legal with Security Council approval and illegal without it as a general
matter, however there may be rare cases of extreme humanitarian necessity
when unauthorized action will in effect be excused by the international com-
munity.
III. THE EVOLVING LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
What about preemptive self-defense? An instructive way of looking at
where that law stands post-9/11 is by comparing the reactions to the US-led
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.2
1. For a review of the literature and analysis of the arguments put forward to justify the
intervention, see Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, 14 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 437, 464-75 (2003).
2. See Ian Johnstone, US-UNRelations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We Know It?,
15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 813, 827-36 (2004).
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The official justification for the US and allied attacks on Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in October 2001, was self-defense in connection with the events of
9/11.3 This was a substantial stretch of the concept of self-defense in a two
respects: it was invoked against a non-state actor (Al-Qaeda); and in exercising
its right of self-defense, the US and its Afghan allies changed the regime in
power in Afghanistan.
What is most interesting from a legal point of view is that the world was
largely prepared to accept this interpretation of Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter (UN Charter). There is ample evidence of this acceptance in the reac-
tions of the Security Council itself and other international organizations such as
NATO; the Organization of American States (OAS); the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC); and even the Organization of Islamic Countries
(OIC), which bent over backwards to avoid condemning the military action as
a violation of international law.
Moreover, many states participated directly or indirectly in Operation
Enduring Freedom, or at least expressed support for it, and they are participating
in the economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan to this day.
However, when self-defense against terrorism was invoked eighteen
months later as one of the justifications for military action against Iraq, the
international reaction was quite different. Few states or knowledgeable
observers were persuaded that the links between Al-Qaeda and the regime of
Saddam Hussein were sufficiently tight to justify the invasion of Iraq on that
basis. When that became obvious, the Bush Administration largely gave up
trying to make its case on the grounds of self-defense, at least to international
audiences. There is no better evidence than the letter of March 20, 2003 that the
United States sent to the President of the Security Council setting out the legal
justification for the war.' It does not contain a word about terrorism, self-
defense, or preemption.' The legal case is based entirely on the enforcement of
existing Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.6
A broader legal question, which was not directly raised by the Iraq case
since self-defense was not the official justification, is whether the doctrine of
preemption, as articulated in the National Security Strategy of 2002, is
3. Letter dated 7 October 2001from the Permanent Representative of the United States ofAmerica
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001).
4. Letter dated 20 March 2003from the Permanent Representative of the United States ofAmerica
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consistent with the law of self-defense as traditionally understood? The central
argument is that Article 51 of the UN Charter permits "anticipatory self-
defense," and that the notion of anticipatory self-defense can and does encom-
pass preemptive strikes against terrorists.
There is a long history to the doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense," going
back to the Caroline case of 1842.' At that time, US Secretary of State Daniel
Webster claimed that self-defense was permissible when the threat of attack was
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation.",8 Although, that is still good law, my reading of the Bush Admini-
stration's version of the doctrine of preemption is not consistent with even the
most liberal interpretation of that law. What some of the language in the
National Security Strategy seems to contemplate is not preemption of a truly
imminent attack when there is clear and convincing evidence that it is about to
be launched, but rather preventive action. There is no self-evident line between
preemption and prevention, but starting a war now in order to prevent some
future, but not well-specified threat from materializing, is not what Secretary of
State Webster had in mind. If accepted in its most expansive form, the doctrine
stretches the term "armed attack" so far, that it becomes virtually meaningless
as a legal concept.
This is not to say that self-defense can never be invoked to forestall future
terrorist attacks. If the attack is truly imminent, or if there is a pattern of attacks
and credible evidence of both their source and the threat of further attacks, then
a state can take defensive military action. This formulation, sometimes called
the "accumulation of events theory,"9 offers a gloss on the notion of anticipatory
self-defense, relaxing the test of "imminence" slightly when there is a pattern
of attacks. The action against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan could be justified on
that basis. The invasion of Iraq could not!
IV. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING
As a result, I read existing law on "unilateral intervention" (intervention
not authorized by the Security Council) as less restrictive than meets the eye;
humanitarian intervention will be excused in some circumstances and preemp-
tive self-defense against some terrorist threats is lawful.
However, in setting up the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, the Secretary General was motivated by a sense that, while unilateral
7. See LORI FISLER DAMROSH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 969 (4th ed.
2001).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, "The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in Another
Country," 19 Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights 209, at 220 (1989); STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1996).
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action is necessary and appropriate to deal with some of these threats, greater
collective action is also required. More specifically, the Security Council must
do more to face its responsibilities in dealing with both kinds of threats.
The Security Council has not been idle in either field. Throughout the
1990s, it was increasingly willing to label human rights or humanitarian crises
as threats to international peace and security, and to authorize coercive action
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in response. While it has not authorized
military action against a terrorist threat to date, it imposed economic sanctions
three times in respect of terrorism: against Libya in 1992; against Sudan in
1996; and on the Taliban in 1999. It has also adopted resolutions 1373 regard-
ing financing and other forms of support for terrorism, and 1540 in order to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists.
These acts of law-making by the Security Council are unprecedented in the
sense that they impose binding obligations on all states in a general issue area
for an indefinite period.
Is it reasonable to think the Council will do more? Without trying to
anticipate what the High Level Panel might say, it seems to me that two steps
could be taken to improve how these threats are dealt with: the adoption of a
set of substantive principles or "considerations" to guide deliberations on
intervention; and procedural innovations to make it more likely the Security
Council will act, and will do so on a principled basis.
A. Substantive Principles/Considerations
The broad outline of substantive principles for intervention was fore-
shadowed in The Responsibility to Protect Report.'0 Those criteria related to
humanitarian intervention alone, but it is not hard to imagine how they might
be converted into more generic principles.
However, instead of hard and fast criteria, I would argue that a more viable
and politically realistic way of proceeding would be for the Security Council,
General Assembly, and/or any other body engaged in this inquiry, to ask itself
a set of questions each time the issue of intervention arises." Questions such
as:
1) What is the magnitude of the threat or emergency?
2) Is the very existence of a state or ethnic group at risk?
10. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 31 (2001).
11. There is a precedent for this. In 1994, the Council adopted a list of considerations to be taken
into account before establishing a peacekeeping mission. Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3372nd mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/22 (1994).
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3) Short of that extreme situation, is there a pattern or history of
actions to suggest that the threat will materialize?
4) How good is the evidence of the threat or emergency? Can it be
verified by credible sources?
5) Are alternatives to preemptive military action available? Have
viable measures short of the use of force been exhausted?
6) What are the prospects of success? Are the interveners willing
to see it through?
These sorts of considerations would not serve as an automatic trigger or set
a threshold for action, but they would structure deliberations and impel the
Council to deal with these threats in a more systematic, norm-based way. They
would force governments proposing intervention to state their case in terms that
are agreed upon in advance. In addition, it would force governments who
oppose action to justify their opposition in those same terms.
B. Procedural Innovations
However, substantive guidelines will not go far towards stimulating
Security Council action, as long as the veto power stands in the way. There is
no self-evident reason why the veto should stand in the way and why each of the
five permanent members (P5) should be the final court of appeal on these sorts
of decisions. However, the Security Council is the only institutional safeguard
that currently exists as a check on abuses. The resulting dilemma is that veto
power can block all attempts at preemptive action and yet a right of unilateral
intervention, other than in self-defense, is too open to abuse.
A procedural way out of this dilemma, suggested by Thomas Pickering at
a recent speech at the Fletcher School, is for the P5 members of the Security
Council to reach a gentleman's agreement providing that decisions about the
preemptive use of force will be put to a straw poll, and unless two of the P5s
signal that they will vote no, the sole objector will abstain on the resolution
rather than veto it.12 In other words, a veto on preemptive action to combat
either terrorists' threats or massive human rights abuses, require that two of the
permanent members vote no.13
An additional safeguard that was not suggested by Mr. Pickering would be
for the Council to appoint an impartial commission to assess whether the factual
premises employed to justify the intervention were accurate. This assessment
12. The Honorable Thomas Pickering, Convocation Address at The Fletcher Law School at Tufts
University (Sept. 9, 2004). Mr. Pickering was not referring to humanitarian intervention or preemptive action
against terrorist threats per se, but his proposal could usefully be adapted to deal with those kinds of threats,
where the twin problems of Security Council paralysis and unilateral abuses are especially acute. Id.
13. Id.
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would have to come after-the-fact, but it could still reduce the risk of abuse by
those in favor of intervention while putting pressure on those who oppose it to
do so for non-arbitrary reasons. 4 Accountability derives from the need to
provide accurate information to justify preemptive intervention, and to do it on
the basis of accepted standards.
Obviously neither of these suggestions would be easy to implement, but
they offer a plausible starting point for discussion about how to improve the
quality of Security Council deliberations and decisions. They are designed to
make Council members more accountable for decisions to act and for decisions
not to act.
V. CONCLUSION
The more radical proposal, which I am not confident I can defend, is to
forget the gentleman's agreement on the veto and instead turn to some other
body for collective endorsement when a veto is cast. The other body could be
a self-constituted group of twenty to twenty-five major powers. Their decisions
would have to be by qualified majority vote, for example, fifteen-twenty, since
all of the P5 members of the Security Council would likely be among the group.
Endorsement by this body would not render the action legal, but might reinforce
claims that it is excusable in the circumstances.
14. See Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan
Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1 (2004).
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